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Austria-Hungary 1914: Nationalisms in a Multi-National Nation-State
Anthony M. Stevens-Arroyo
stevensa@ptd.net
“Austria is disunity and partition into petty states, darkness, Jesuitism, reaction and the
whorish way of doing things of the patriarchal rule of the police.”
- Ludwig Bamberger, Radical German émigré, 1859
“We shall have a little parliamentarianism, but power will remain in my hands and the
whole thing will be adapted to Austrian realities.”
- Emperor Frantz Josef, 1861
“…civilized states by and large have adopted that organization which, in the whole
continent, rests on historical foundations only in Hungary.”
- Ernő Nagy, Nagyvárad Law School Professor, 1887
Introduction
“Austria is disunity and partition into petty states, darkness, Jesuitism, reaction and the
whorish way of doing things of the patriarchal rule of the police,” wrote Ludwig Bamberger,
an early radical, in 1859. Yet, four decades later on the eve of the 20th century, the Austrian
Empire enjoyed an economic prosperity that was the most impressive in Central Europe.
Vienna became a world-recognized center of scientific and cultural achievements featuring
personages like the Moravian-born Jewish physician Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) in the
new science of psychology and the Pole, Carl Menger (1840–1921) in economics. Who
doesn’t know of Franz Liszt (1811–1886), born in Hungary and who performed in the salons
of Paris and Vienna? The Strauss waltzes by Johann (1804-1849) the father and his sons
made Vienna synonymous with refinement, renowned for its cuisine and fashion in the gay
‘90s. Operettas like “The Merry Widow” by Budapest transplant Franz Lehár (1870-1948)
provided the bridge between the 19th and 20th centuries while celebrating Austro-Hungarian
genius.
In 1914, the nation’s borders sprawled north to Poland and Russia and west to Germany,
Italy and the Mediterranean. Austria-Hungary in the 1910 census was less than a quarter
German (23.9%) or Magyar (20.2%); the two combined did not account for the majority of
the nation’s population that also numbered Czechs (12.6%), Croats (5.3%), Italians (2%),
Slovaks (3.8%), Serbs (3.8%), Slovenes (2.6%), Ruthenes (7.9%) and Romanians (6.4%).
The Empire had provided legal emancipation to more than a half-million Jews earlier than
any neighboring country and the Roma, commonly known as Gypsies, had contributed
immensely to the popular culture in spite of stubborn social prejudice against them.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015
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Yet, the Great War that began in 1914 was ignited by separatist nationalism that
assassinated the Empire’s Grand Duke in Serbia. It was left to post-war treaties to
dismember this multi-national state into a puzzle of competing nationalities that have yet to
re-establish the stability and prosperity of 1914 when the country was whole.
The questions I raise are these: Was the multi-national nation-state of Austria-Hungary a
historical aberration surely to be avoided? Or, rather, was it an imperfect but prophetic
expression of today’s European Union?” Hence my title for Austria-Hungary in 1914:
“Nationalisms in a Multi-National Nation-State.”
1. Nationalisms and Civilizations
The word play invoked in the title for this presentation cries out for some definitions.
“Nation” is the root term and its historical variants are encumbered against a historical
backdrop. The Italic root is “NAT-”, indicating “birth” or “origin;” whence “nativity” and
“nature.” We often think of “nation” as the place where one is born, but for most of human
history, birth was into a relationship rather than to a place. With that relationship came a
common heritage of historical existence, inherited cultural norms and, of course, language.
The primary meaning of “nation” is relational to social belonging within a specific group:
“place” enters the definition only derivatively and more recently.
We cannot completely discard, however, the role of location in consideration of nationality
as a relationship. Social relationships are anchored by time and place as people of the same
nation adapt to circumstance and environment. Hence, history gives us “Ostrogoths” and
“Visigoths” as defining terms of “eastern” and “western” to the Goth nation.
The technology of travel and communication also alter the application of “nation.”
Compact interrelated groups may be nations, but a small size defines “clan” or “tribe” rather
than “nation.” Contrariwise, modern communications summons groups in Diaspora to a
common identity with movements such as “Pan-Germanism” or “Pan-Slavism.” Migration
forced by material need is perhaps the major reason for evolution and differentiation among
linguistic nations, but the imposition of alien nationality by military intervention is no less
important. In fact, the definition of “empire” leans heavily on the notion of “disparate
nations under a single ruler.”

The topic of Austria-Hungary in 1914 and its nationalisms, therefore, does not contradict
the idea of a multi-national nation-state, since this definition presumes that the different
national identities are not only alive and well, but simultaneously balanced and harmonized.
The starting point for my analysis requires a quick excursus into how Sir Arnold Toynbee
treats of multi-national states in the history of civilization. He links the Hellenist era to the
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/8
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Roman Empire in a continuous civilization. Both represent a break with more ancient
civilizations such as the Egyptian and Persian which incorporated subject nations
differently.
Previous to the Hellenist policy, nationality was summarized in religious symbolism: since
the conquering ruler was divinely ordained, fealty required the conquered peoples to honor
the Emperor with worship. The Pre-Greek ancient civilizations looked not so much for the
“divine right of kings,” as it for “the right of divine kings.” The Hellenist approach was to
syncretize a nation’s deities with those of Hellas, so that worship of any patriarchal deity
such as Amun-Ra or Ba’al Samen was simultaneously adoration of Zeus; similarly,
Aphrodite was also honored as Isis (Egyptian) and Ishtar (Bablyonian).
This Hellenist religious syncretism may not have been universally successful,1 but it proved
a more palatable religious accommodation than outright repression. It certainly permitted
the Hellenist hegemony for commerce and law that made Greek Western civilization’s
lingua franca. Successor state Rome was more interested in commerce and domination
than in religious syncretism or even than in the Latin language. A considerable respect was
afforded conquered nations under the legal construct of “lex gentium.”
In effect, the Roman Empire created two levels of law. The most local law followed
established religious customs for worship, inheritance, marriage, and contracts and was
faithful to the existing law of the conquered people. At a higher level, one that required
tribute to Rome and ensured commerce and transit within the Empire, were the Roman
statutes. These statutes were not designed to interfere with local practice, but only to
regulate practices that competed with public order under Roman rule. While Rome
considered itself the hegemonic “gens/people” it recognized that other nations although
subjugated were also “gentes/peoples.” Providentially, even when the Julian emperors
began to demand worship as gods, the lex gentium exempted the Jewish religion in which
such worship would have caused rebellion.2
This Roman concept allowed the Empire to outlast its pagan origins, since the same concept
of lex gentium became the operative concept behind the creation of a Holy Roman Empire
under Charlemagne in the year 800 AD. One notes that in history this proved to be neither
holy nor Roman nor an empire, but with the rise of the Hapsburg dynasty in the 15th century,
the country now known as Austria was a featured contestant in the struggle to use the title
of Holy Roman Empire as a lever of power.

The “abomination of abominations” was reportedly the statue of Zeus placed in the Temple of Jerusalem to
be syncretized with the Hebrew, Yahweh.
1

2

The lex gentium did not apply to Christians, since their religion soon included believers from different
nations besides Jews. Christians would be persecuted because their creed lay “beyond the bounds” (super
stitio from super-stare) of any one nation. This is the justification for the persecution by Domitian, last of
the Flavian dynasty.
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2. The Hapsburgs and Austria from Napoleon to the Ausgleich

The Napoleonic age rendered this imperial fiction meaningless and after the Battle at
Austerlitz on 6 August 1806 the last Holy Roman Emperor Francis II abdicated that title,
contenting himself as Emperor of Austria (Eastern Germany) alone. For the next halfcentury, Austria and Prussia wrestled for hegemony as the principal German state unifying
the congeries of duchies and principalities into a single nation. Religion played a major
role as Prussia in the north favored the Lutheran and Reformation creeds, while Austria
remained mostly Catholic. Following its defeat in only seven weeks in the Austro-Prussian
War of 1866, and the cession of its Italian provinces around Venice, Austria began to look
south to the Balkans and eastward to Hungary for opportunities of expansion.
This historical background suggests that nationalisms can be separatist and centrifugal or
unifying and centripetal. The phenomenon of Austria-Hungary 1867-1914 exemplifies the
interaction of both tendencies within nationalism.
Abandoning the struggle of Austria against Prussia as the hegemonic power in a united
Germany, Austria-Hungary was created as a multi-national state by signing a treaty or
Ausgleich or historic merger of Austria and Hungary as two countries under one monarch.
The Emperor, Franz Josef (regnum 1848-1916) was ruler at the beginning and was to be
there at the end in 1914, with a reign of 58 years that demonstrated his ability to survive as
much as his ability to rule.
The connection to Hungarian sovereignty had begun much earlier when King Louis II of
the Jagiellonian dynasty had lost his life in battle against the Turks at Mohács in 1526. But
that relationship was based on the necessity for Hungary, once invaded and divided by
Ottoman Turks, to rely on a Catholic protector for its Christian population.3

3

The Turks had utilized the Catholic-Protestant theological divisions to establish a Calvinist-dominated subprovince in the northeast sector of Hungary near contemporary Debrecen. Taking advantage of the conflicts
during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the Ottoman appointed ruler, Prince Gábor Bethlen of
Transylvania, successfully attacked the Austrian-supported Catholic Hungary in 1619, and laid claim to the
Hungarian throne, i.e. the Crown of St. Stephen. This history is very complicated and includes Bethlen’s
renunciation of the title of king based on a condition of enlightened decree of freedom of religion (1621)
before that from any European country. Although the Prince of Transylvania’s aspirations to be monarch of
Hungary were thwarted by other European powers, France eventually supported one of Bethlen’s successors,
Ferenc II (Rákóczi). The idea was to use Hungarians as French pawns to resist Austrian Catholic domination.
Seeing through these deceptions, Rákóczi opted to declare total Hungarian independence, issuing an
unenforceable devolution writ from the Hungarian crown to the Austrian monarch (Josef I) in 1707, an
action for which Rákóczi is much admired in Hungarian history. Defeated in battle in 1708, he was forced
into exile, first to Poland where he was offered the crown at the machinations of Russian Tsar, Peter I. He
eventually settled in the Turkish dominions after 1717, where he gathered leading dissenters from Austrian
domination. A melody reputed to be one of his favorite musical pieces was orchestrated by Franz Liszt in
“Rákóczi’s March,” as part of Hungarian Rhapsody, Number 15 and served as unofficial anthem of Hungary
until the 19th century.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/8
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With the catastrophic loss of Austrian prestige and the crushing of its aspirations to lead a
united Germany after the 1866 war, the decision to create a dual monarchy with Hungary
seemed the salvation of a bad situation for both defeated Austria and sovereignty-deprived
Hungary. The Emperor was famously to have quipped: “We shall have a little
parliamentarianism, but power will remain in my hands and the whole thing will be adapted
to Austrian realities” (Molnar: 207). But his wife, Empress Elizabeth, loved in Hungary as
“Sissi,” had prepared Hungarians to view the Ausgleich quite differently: “What Vienna
gave the Magyars as a punishment, the Hungarians received as a gift” (Molnar: 210). It is
more telling, therefore, to view the nationalities’ project through the Magyar lens, rather
than the Austrian one because the former was innovative, while the latter was merely
temporizing.
3. The Nationalities Law of the Hungarian Experience
The new Hungarian Constitution affirmed in law most of the reforms sought in the 1848
convulsion led by Lajos Kossuth, the dashing advocate of total Hungarian independence
within an imagined Danubian Confederation (Lendvai, 256 ff.). The premature republic
sought by Kossuth collapsed and he left his homeland for exile. The pieces were picked up
by Ferenc Deák (1803-1876) who also had played a key role in 1848.
The heart of innovative reform was in the Nationalities Law that was essentially an 1868
reiteration of Law VIII promulgated on 28 July 1849 in the southern Hungarian city of
Szeged. It guaranteed equality to every citizen “with equal rights, to whichever nationality
he belongs.” (cited in Lendvai, 294, ftn. 23).
While Austria may have pretended that its concessions had left it as the ruling power and
the Hungarian partners of secondary importance, the legal basis for the entire Empire was
closer to the Hungarian aspiration. Despite fealty to the same monarch, each country had
its own independent parliament, used its own currency (although each was acceptable to the
partner) and shared little more than an integrated army and a common foreign policy.
The 1868 Nationalities Act conferred on the Croatian Assembly or Sabor the same
autonomous power as Hungary because Croatia was recognized -- as were Bohemia and
Moravia for Austria -- as historically pre-existing nations now freely joined within the
multi-national nation state for mutual protection and progress.
Deák accepted that the Dual Monarchy had not brought complete independence to Hungary,
but he was willing to accept compromise based on the insight of the great Hungarian patriot,
Baron Istvan Széchenyi (1791-1860): “If the Hungarian earthenware were to knock against
the German and Slav iron pot, it would soon be shattered.”
Recognizing the Realpolitik of the moment, Deák wrote of 1867:

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015
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Most European powers are so great and have at their disposal so much power that
Hungary could not exist in their midst as a single, independent country without an
alliance offering secure support. Fate has placed our country in the midst of Great
Powers, each of which could undoubtedly sweep us away with its superior armed force
if it believed that we stood in the way of its wishes and plans. (Cited in Lendvai 281.)

The logic that a small nation needed to merge with a larger, more powerful one to preserve
its identity would become the reason both for expansion of the Empire and for its undoing.
Offering itself as defender of Christianity against Ottoman persecution, the Empire moved
southward to absorb recalcitrant Balkan provinces such as Bosnia and Herzegovina under
its protection (1878) and eventual annexation (1908); or north where Bohemia and Moravia
had been aligned with Austria against Prussian dominance. The Magyars fostered a similar
expansion into Transylvania, transitioning from a province under the Ottomans (1571) to
liberated Christians a little more than one-hundred years later (1687) and finally as
participants in the multi-national empire. Such also was Croatia’s status. The southern
Polish province of Galicia (1793) was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the third
partition of Poland since it had survived the Napoleonic restoration of Poland as its Baltic
provinces.
Technically there was not one country by the name of Austria-Hungary but a multi-national
“Cisleithania” (Hungarian: Ciszlajtánia) or "Lands represented in the Imperial Council."
Law required all documents to be published in 8 official languages.4
To govern this diverse, multi-national government, the principal partners, Austria and
Hungary, divided responsibilities towards the smaller nationalities. Then each of the
partners created an executive committee of 60 members who met with their counterpart to
discuss joint matters once a year, meeting alternately in Vienna and Budapest. From these
yearly meetings came laws for all of the Empire “by means of the Emperor’s confirmation”
(Lendvai 285).
No doubt, placing this structure on top of the sovereign decisions by each country as well
as by their constituent members created a confusing and inefficient apparatus. The
delegations could only rehash decisions already made by their separate and equal national
assemblies but without the power to change them. Writing in The Man Without Qualities,
a historical novel about this period, the Modernist author, Robert Musil (1860-1942)
assessed the experience of supra-national government this way:
“German: Cisleithanien, also Zisleithanien, Hungarian: Ciszlajtánia, Czech: Předlitavsko, Polish:
Przedlitawia, Croatian: Cislajtanija, Slovene: Cislajtanija, Ukrainian: Цислейтанія, transliterated:
Tsysleitàniia) was a common yet unofficial denotation of the northern and western part of Austria-Hungary,
the Dual Monarchy created in the Compromise of 1867—as distinguished from Transleithania, i.e. the
Hungarian Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen east of ("beyond") the Leitha River.” At times the
Ukranians were designated as “Ruthenians” and Rumanians were included as the Transleithanian Province
of Transylvania. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cisleithania.
4
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…the national movements…were so violent that they jammed the machinery of
government and brought it to a dead stop several times a year, but in the intervals and
during the deadlocks people got along perfectly well and acted as if nothing had
happened.” (Musil 30-31).
The Hungarians developed a legal theory for these autonomous nations based on the notion
that the Magyar nation originated not from the will of a monarch, but of an Estates General
consisting of nobles who elected the ruler. Bizarrely, a 19th century legal professor, Ernő
Nagy (1853-1921), mystically linked possession of the 11th century Crown of St. Stephen
with the right to national sovereignty based on the sentiment that “the Holy Crown is the
same for the Hungarians as the Lost Ark is for the Jews."5 Moreover, Nagy considered the
Hungarian model to be the fundamental progressive basis of all Western civilization.
While these paeans of praise from the Magyars were clearly exaggerations, the material
reality of Hungary after 1867 was truly transformational. The economy of Hungary
expanded fivefold between 1870 and 1910. The traditional agricultural base underwent an
industrial phase of food and grain preparation, based on scientific principles of cultivation
and marketing.
Scarcely a generation after the Ausgleich, Budapest had grown to a metropolitan area of
over a million persons and was the largest milling center for grain in Europe, outsized only
by Minneapolis, Minnesota (Kontler 309). The Ganz machine works was “a main
workshop” inventing the transformer (1885) and producing the first electric locomotive.
The carburetor for combustion engines was invented by János Csonka at Ganz (1891) and
the first subway in Europe was built in Budapest in 1896.
Hungarian Jews enjoyed emancipation as nowhere else in Europe and constituted a quarter
of Budapest population, earning the sneers of Austrian anti-Semites that the city was better
called “Judapest.” The public educational system was free and excellent. Six of Hungary’s
eight Nobel Prize winners6 went through the system, as did other notables such as
composers Béla Bartok and Zoltan Kodaly, with philosopher-sociologists György Lukács,
Károly Mannheim, and Károly Polányi (Kontler 306).

5

"De sacra corona regni Hungariae ortu, virtuti, victoria, fortuna... brevis commentarius. " Baron Péter
Révay de Szklabina et Blathnicza: 1613.
6

It was joked that Hungarian was the language spoken by the physicists for the Manhattan Project, speaking
English only when Oppenheimer was in the room.
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Undermining Multi-Nationalism with Centrifugal Nationalisms

The success of the multi-national state in many important socio-economic matters,
however, was not without its contradictions. This legal establishment of multi-national
diversity was not always honored in practice, as nationalistic forces in Austria and Hungary
tended to see their own nationality as hegemonic within the Empire and able to direct policy
unilaterally. Ultimately these forces undermined political stability and, once the outcome
of the Great War was settled, led to the dismemberment of the Empire.
The dissolution process for multi-national states is addressed by Sir Arnold Toynbee in A
Study of History, his multi-volume masterwork of civilizational analysis. In a chapter
(XVIII) entitled “Schism in the Body Social” Toynbee analyzes the role of nationality and
religious minorities within empires. I would add that his Hellenic prototype of internal
proletariats fits the Austro-Hungarian experience. (Somervell Abridgement, Vols. 1-VI:
375 ff.).
According to his analysis, the effort to incorporate national minorities requires the education
of elites drawn from the non-hegemonic minorities. These recruits are placed within social
administration of the state and initially perform the tasks of integration. But with the
passage of time, these persons become aware that they have not achieved equality with the
dominant group.
They become “a large and ever larger floating population of ‘stateless’ exiles,” writes
Toynbee (376), who viewed the effort of assimilation as “the cruel process of
‘deracination.’” This elite possessing considerable organizational and professional skills is
reduced to functions as a proletariat at the mercy of exploitation.
These first recruits had been disinherited in the first instance by being robbed of a
spiritual birthright: but of course their spiritual impoverishment was often accompanied,
and was almost always followed, by pauperization on the material plane, and they were
soon reinforced by recruits from other classes who were material as well as spiritual
proletarians from the start.” (Ibid, 377-78).
Initially, these nationality elites believe in their prospects for successful upward mobility as
a nationality minority. However, they encounter mounting frustrations and eventually
realize that what was a promising future is a disguise of perpetual inferiority. The
consequence is disillusionment with the hegemonic power and bitter rejection of the
assimilative ideal. In other words, the internal proletariat of the subordinate nationality
group moves from a nationalism that is centripetal, favoring union with the larger and
dominant group, to a centrifugal expression that seeks separation from the metropolitan
center.
Toynbee finds an example for this type in the Jewish Maccabees’ rejection of Hellenist
assimilation.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/8
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When we come to examine how these victims of injustice reacted to their fate, we shall
not be surprised to find that one of their reactions was an explosion of savagery which
surpassed in violence the cold-blooded cruelty of their oppressors and exploiters. (Ibid,
378).
Given Toynbee’s classificatory genius, the assassination of the Archduke by the Serbian
nationalists in the Black Hand is not a surprise. To be clear, the assassination was the
beginning of the First World War that spelled the end of the Empire, but it was a culminating
act against decades-old misguided policies, rather than an unexpected rupture of normality.
I would like briefly to sketch the competing visions of the Empire for its internal proletarian
nationalisms and why for both Austria and Hungary the post-war dismemberment was selfinflicted.
5. Austria’s German Bias
Austria’s policy towards nationalism reflected Vienna’s obsession with 19th century power
games. With the amputation of its aspirations to lead all of Germany, Austria no longer
was one of continent’s “great” powers at the beginning of the 20th century: that status had
been relegated to Germany, England, France and Tsarist Russia. Austria offered itself as
the necessary protector of small territories and cultures against Muslim Turkey.
Its foreign policy after 1878, when awarded Serbia as a protectorate by the Congress of
Berlin, was to compete with Russia in accumulating the frayed ends of the Ottoman
provinces. Thus did German Austria seek to preserve its sphere of influence and prevent
Russian penetration into the Balkans.
Carrot and stick are tools of empires. Seeking to pacify rising Serbian nationalism, AustriaHungary allowed Serbia to assume sovereignty as a kingdom within the Empire in 1882.
This “bought time” while the economic ties took hold. Austria’s industrial and commercial
bases were constructed upon exploitation of the underdeveloped Balkan territories. For
instance, railroad lines linked Serbia to Vienna and the establishment of commercial credits
for Serbian agricultural products built up a mutual dependency that delivered 84% of
Serbian exports to Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the century.
This economic dependency might have been broken if Serbia had been permitted to follow
a natural expansion of its borders into Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would have provided
Serbia with an Adriatic coastline among its kindred Balkan Slavs professing Orthodox
Christianity.
But taking advantage of a revolt against Ottoman rulers in Turkey in 1908, Austria instead
formally annexed both Bosnia and Herzegovina, keeping itself as intermediary for
economic development.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015
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The annexation simultaneously thwarted Russia’s appeal as the great power protector of
Pan-Slavic nationalism and those professing Orthodox Christianity and propped up an
increasingly unpopular German hegemony.
Austria often justified its imperial aspirations by arrogant expressions of German
superiority to Slavic backwardness. Vienna viewed itself as a more enlightened and
progressive master of the Serbs, Bosnians and other Balkan peoples than the retrograde
Russian Empire.
This prejudice, however, undermined the foundation stone for the multi-national state
which rested on legal equality for all nationalities. It produced a propagandistic downward
death spiral because the more Austria deprecated Russia as Slavic, the less appeal it had as
legitimate government for Slavs in the Balkans. The more the educated Slavic Balkan elites
protested, the more they were repressed. The more repressed, the more violent became their
resistance. The more violent their resistance, the more savage was Austrian reprisal.
6. Magyarization and its Consequences
Hungarian policy towards nationalities had its origin on a higher plane and more noble
political premise of equality. The eclipse of the liberal generation of 1848, however, gave
power to conservatives, most notably Kálman Tizsa (1875-1890), the longest serving Prime
Minister in Hungarian history.
Key to understanding the regression away from the enlightened Nationalities Law is the
attitude towards Croatia. Déak in 1861 had stressed that Croatia was equal to Hungary as
a nation-state and not merely as a nationality in diaspora. 7 It became “Hungary’s Achilles
heel,”8 however, because of a refusal to allow the Croats to assemble their own parliament,
or Sabor, as had been promised. Simultaneously, the country’s nationalities suffered from
the Magyarization of public service9 and the school system, notoriously culminated by the
Lex Apponyi under a Minister of Education by that name (1906-1910).
As in Austria, the natural elites of the nationality minorities chaffed under the repression
that violated multi-ethnic promises and the spiral of resistance followed a similar dark path.

“Croatia possesses its own territory. It is in a special position: it was never incorporated into Hungary, but
was our associate, sharing our rights, our duties, our good times and our hardships.” Deák, 1861: cited in
Lendvai, 297, ftn. 24.
8
Gusztáv Gratz, former Hungarian foreign minister, writing in The Era of Dualism (1934) cited in Lendvai
298, ftn. 25.
9
“In 1910, 96 per cent of civil servants, 91.2 per cent of all public employees, 96.8 of judges and public
prosecutors, 91.5 of secondary school teachers and 89 per cent of medical doctors had Hungarian as their
mother-tongue. Similar percentages were found in the staffs of libraries, publishing houses and newspapers”
(Lendvai, 301, ftn. 5). This elite representation compares to the slight majority of Hungarian speakers in the
population (54.5%).
7
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We can perhaps absolve Hungarians for believing that linguistic Magyarization was an
antidote to the siren of Pan-Slavism, Croatian separatism or Polish unity. With the 13th
century devastations from the Mongols, ethnic Magyars had been virtually wiped out.10 For
centuries, the unity of the region had been based, not upon blood descent, but upon adoption
of the Hungarian language.11
What cannot be forgiven is the wanton perpetuation in 19th century Hungary of its top-heavy
social structure, affording hereditary privileges to noble families despite the obvious
contradictions of this feudal practice to the liberalizing spirit of the reconstituted monarchy.
Moreover, the resultant social distance of an anachronistic class structure was magnified by
the practice of latifundia. The concentration of landed property in the hands of so few
distinguished Hungary in negative ways from all its European neighbors except Romania.
Nearly 200 of the nobility each possessed lands of more than 15,000 acres and one alone,
Prince Móric Esterházy, owned a quarter of Hungary’s agricultural fields himself. Kontler
notes:
Hundreds of thousands of peasant families literally vegetated on plots of a few acres.
These were utterly incapable of any sort of modernization; and whereas most of the
major landowners successfully participated in the capitalist economy, these successes
contributed to the consolidation of the economic power and social prestige, and the
preservation of much of the political influence and value system, of the traditional elite.
(Kontler 305).
Faced with such a punishing future, the poor peasants of the Hungarian plain, or puszta,
desperately sought passage to America in the two decades immediately before and after the
turn of the century. They worked in the mines of Pennsylvania and its steel works; they
toiled in the textile mills of Philadelphia and the iron works shops of New York and Newark,
usually hoping to earn enough money to return to Hungary and buy land.
The exodus put even greater burdens on those left behind, with harder work and longer
hours. The remedies for workers were membership in unions and the organizing of strikes
for better conditions, but these were distant from the rural areas and every manifestation
was brutally repressed.
Meanwhile, life in the city offered scant relief, especially for the other nationalities.
Magyarization reserved influence and privilege to those with Hungarian names and longstanding national identity. Thus, along with the Germanic hegemony in the Austrian
10

See Kontler, 78ff.
“Anthropologically and even culturally, ‘Hungarian’ is an extremely mixed phenomenon, so that no such a
thing as ‘pure stock Hungarian’ in this sense has existed since time immemorial. As a result the only
criterion to establish the continuity of a Hungarian people is language; the history of Hungarian origins is the
history of a community whose genetic composition and cultural character has been changing, but which has
assuredly spoken Hungarian or its predecessor language for the last few thousand years.” Kontler, 34.
11

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2015

11

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 72 [2015], No. 72, Art. 8

110

Number 72, Spring 2015

counterpart, the Magyarization in Hungary reduced the aspiring other-ethnic elites from full
participation in society.
The internal proletariat created by these biased policies mobilized the migrant communities
in exile towards more radical political change. These exile groups became Toynbee’s
“external proletariat.” They agitated on the continent and from America for redress of the
endemic ethnic inequalities that had become part of the social and political structure of the
Empire.
Finally, we must register how scarcity and economic downturns stimulated rebellion against
the status quo. Toynbee wrote:
The radiation of any civilization may be analyzed into three elements – economic,
political and cultural – and, so long as the society is in a state of growth, all three
elements seem to be radiated with equal power, or, to speak in human rather than
physical terms, to exercise an equal charm. But, as soon as the civilization has ceased
to grow, the charm of its culture evaporates. Its powers of economic and political
radiation may, and indeed probably will, continue to grow faster than ever, for a
successful cultivation of the pseudo-religions of Mammon and Mars and Moloch is
eminently characteristic of broken-down civilizations (Toynbee: 405-406).
Mars was definitely the major player in the dissolution of this multi-national expression of
civilization after 1914.
7. Aftermath
This paper is not about the Great War, but a few items merit comment here. First, the
military effort of Austria-Hungary on the eastern front against Russia was largely
successful, especially after the Bolshevik revolution took Russia out of the war. Moreover,
Austria’s other traditional enemy, Turkey, was on the same side.
Second, when it was apparent Germany was going to lose the war because of the American
entry in 1917, the prime ministers of both Austria and Hungary unsuccessfully sought a
separate peace with the Allies.12
Third, Wilson’s fourteen points, upon which the peace treaties were based, called for
autonomy of the Empire’s ethnic minorities and not for full independence. It was largely
because of the pressure of the exiled minorities in Paris, London and New York that small
independent states were carved out of Austria-Hungary. Hungary lost two-thirds of its
territory and Austria surrendered what became Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Austria’s treaty was different from the Treaty of Versailles signed with Germany: Austria made peace at
Saint-Germain-en-Laye, while Hungary was forced to accept dismemberment in the Treaty of Trianon.
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Lastly, the West foolishly presumed that independence would bring about liberal
democracies as an inevitable consequence. They were wrong. Moreover, in the victims of
the dismemberment, nationalisms grew as touchstones of revenge and restoration, of antiSemitism and militarism. This opened Austria to fascism, culminating in the Anschluss
with Nazi Germany (12 March 1938). Hungary under the dictator, Admiral Miklós Horthy,
sided with the Axis in order to briefly regain territories lost after the World War I.
8. Conclusions
One can question whether the multi-national state has proven to be either a success or a
failure, based on the historical experience of Austria-Hungary as viewed retrospectively
from 1914, one hundred years ago. This paper does not pretend to resolve that sticky
problem; however, I venture my opinion that any judgment ought to originate from the
premise that Austria-Hungary did not show the respect for nationalisms promised in the 19th
century when the Dual Monarchy was established. In other words, it offers a vision of what
a multi-national state may look like, but not enough of consistent policy to make itself into
a model of multi-nationalism.
The second question is whether the Austrian-Hungarian model anticipated in any way the
current multi-national cooperation of the European Union.
I begin by suggesting that the genesis of the European Union was very different from the
political opportunism of the 1867 Ausgleich. Nonetheless, the issues such as common
defense, language variation, coordinated policies of public services and a host of
commercial and business practices were essential elements of the convivium invited by the
Empire. These same features figure in other multi-national states that have followed in
history. The most notable of these imitators was Yugoslavia that federated five
nationalities, including those previously in the Empire.
However, we must additionally note that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was also
designed as a multi-national state. Since the breakup of the USSR into constituent nations,
it has become fashionable to consider it to have been a failed state. However one may view
communism as a socio-economic system, one of the positive results of the Communist
Revolution was the creation of several nations with notable tolerance and intermarriage
among different nationalities. While Chechnya illustrates the limitations of this tolerance,
the larger picture suggests a relatively successful integration of various nations.
Certainly, the most likely point of comparison of 1914’s Austria-Hungary is today’s
European Union. In the contemporary European Union, there are clear signs that cohesion
has been achieved by the centripetal force of most nationalisms.
To repeat the effect of this nationalism, I would suggest the following. In order to achieve
a greater prosperity generated by international trade and commerce while avoiding division,
the participating nations of today’s European Union, like those in the 19th century AustroHungarian Empire, gain by belonging to the greater whole. Croats and Slovenes today, like
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Croats and Slovenes within the Empire of the 19th century, view membership in the larger
European community as providing advantages that isolation as separate entities would not.
I would also suggest that the dominance of centripetal nationalisms does not eliminate the
functionality of centrifugal nationalisms. I infer, instead, that the two opposing forces of
nationalisms balance each other.
The desire to benefit the local community is centrifugal nationalism, arguing that each of
the peoples must think of themselves first and foremost. However, the need to extend
commerce and share technological progress persuades the members of the EU to continue
as parts of the larger whole. This is my definition of centripetal nationalism, pulling the
disparate parts toward the unifying center.
When in the Austro-Hungarian Empire the smaller nationalities failed to see advantage to
membership within the Empire for their peoples, the centripetal nationalism was
overwhelmed by the centrifugal forces that culminated in the establishment of small
separate nation states. We do not yet know if this will be the ultimate fate of the EU, for
there are certainly centrifugal nationalisms throughout Europe.
Nonetheless, the dominance of the centripetal or centralizing force does not negate the coexistence of separatist tendencies.
Another factor in creating balance between the two types of nationalisms may be the role
of the supra-national parliament. In Austria-Hungary this joint council was terribly
inefficient, yet it served as safety valve to blow off tensions between the partners. In a
similar way, the current European Parliament for the Union has many new nationalistic,
viz. centrifugal, representatives. But while they reflect the desires to nullify policies
imposing uniformity, their dissent is contained within structures for dialogue.
Thus, a balance is maintained between the centrifugal and centripetal nationalisms. I
suspect that the separatist trends in Scotland against the United Kingdom and in Catalonia
against Spain are balanced with the centripetal nationalisms in both places that seek
admission to the European Union as compensation for independence from the metropolitan
power.
A final reflection on nationalisms within a multi-national nation-state concerns the United
States of America. Here, one need distinguish between multi-culturalism and nationalism.
Multi-culturalism is a result of liberalism which accedes to individuals the choices of
membership in different social groups. Nationalism, race and religion are all surrogate
choices within the framework of liberal democracy.
To these, I would add a new regionalism that shadows the 19th century division between the
northern states faithful to the constitution and the southern confederate states that claimed
the power to nullify the laws passed by a majority population. It is worrisome that those
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol72/iss72/8
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rejecting the democratic will of the majority today base their dissent upon a claim to more
authoritatively represent the “real” America and sometimes merge their political activism
with white supremacists, militia groups armed with military weapons, and anti-scientific
religious theories that justify bigotry and racism. These trends also marked the Austrian
Anschluss once a balance with multi-nationalism went unneeded.
The nationalisms within the United States of America that are comparable with the issue
under discussion concern the states conquered and annexed after conflicts with Mexico in
the 19th century as well as the island of Puerto Rico, an American colony. Canada has a
similar conquest origin for its multi-national diversity as both English and French, as well
as immigration that creates a multi-cultural dynamic in addition to the nationalisms.
America’s strong tradition of multi-culturalism for immigrants has historically
overshadowed matters related to the Hispanic nationalism in Puerto Rico and the
Southwestern states. It is not uncommon in American culture to lump these conquered
peoples with immigrants who voluntarily chose the United States as a new country. At
present, the only significant revanchist nationalism with centrifugal impact is in Puerto
Rico.
However, the rise of an internal proletariat composed of qualified professionals from these
colonial groups and the racial minorities does offer a parallel to the factors that ultimately
undid the Austro-Hungarian Empire. An effective analysis of the American future, I would
think, requires the prism of Toynbee’s civilizational process. Learning from the AustroHungarian Empire one hundred years ago is the place to start. And the deciding voices may
come from among Mammon, Mars and Moloch.
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